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The  Colorado  River  Salinity  Problem:
Direct  Economic  Damages  in  Mexico
Francisco Oyarzabal-Tamargo and Robert A. Young
The  Colorado  River  winds  for  over  fourteen
hundred  miles  from  its headwaters  in  the  Rocky
Mountains  before  it  discharges  into  the  Gulf  of
California  in  Mexico.  In  common  with  most
rivers in arid  lands,  the  Colorado accumulates  dis-
solved  salts (salinity) in its course to the sea. These
salts are picked  up  from  both natural sources  (dis-
solved  in  surface  runoff  or  discharged  from  salt
springs)  and  man-made  sources  (irrigation  return
flows,  municipal and industrial  discharge).  From a
near  pristine  quality  in  the  high  mountains,  the
mineral  concentrations  in  the  waters of the  Colo-
rado reach  800-900  parts per million (ppm) in the
lower basin, and  still higher levels in Mexico.
The  "United  States-Mexico  Treaty  for  Utiliza-
tion  of Waters  of the Colorado and Tijuana  Rivers
and of the  Rio  Grande,"  signed in  1944, provides
that  Mexico  is  guaranteed  an  annual  quantity  of
1.5  million  acre-feet  (m.a.f.)  of the  waters  of the
Colorado  River.  Neither  the  quantity  nor  the
quality of the water was  an issue until about 1961.
Prior  to that  time, Mexico had received  flows well
in excess  of  treaty  requirements,  which served  to
dilute  saline  irrigation  return  flows  from  the  U.S.
to a quality very nearly of that utilized in California
and  Arizona.  (Physical, legal and economic  aspects
of  the  problem  are  detailed  in the  "international
Symposium  on the Salinity  of the Colorado River."
Natural Resources Journal, Volume  15,  Number  1,
January  1975.  See  also  Herbert  Brownell  and
Samuel  Eaton.)
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However, in 1961, the Wellton-Mohawk  Division
of  the  Bureau  of  Reclamation's  Gila  Project  in
southwestern  Arizona  commenced  operation  of a
system  of drainage  wells  which  discharged  saline
water into the  Colorado  below  the  last U.S.  diver-
sion point.  The  drainage  water had an initial salin-
ity  of 6000  ppm,  since  it consisted  in  substantial
portion of ground water that had been concentrated
through  re-use  over  several  previous  decades  of
irrigation.  Also  in  1961,  a  reduction in  deliveries
to Mexico had an impact on water quality. For the
period  1951-60,  Mexico  received,  on the  average,
over 4 m.a.f.  per year. Due to the need for storage
in  Lake Powell,  behind  the nearly  completed Glen
Canyon  Dam, the average  flow after  1961  dropped
to the  compact limit,  1.5  m.a.f. As a consequence,
the  waters  delivered  to  Mexico  were  degraded  to
over  2000  ppm for  a period  in  1962 as  compared
with about 800 ppm in 1960.
High  concentration  of salinity  in the  irrigation
water  reduces  yields  of  crops.  Acreage  of land
cropped  in  the  Mexicali  Valley  fell  as  marginal
lands  were  abandoned  due  to decreased yields and
as  the  irrigation  district reduced  water  allotments
to  cope  with  the  lower  supply level.  The  Mexicali
farmers  reacted  vigorously  and  formal  protests to
the U.S.  were lodged  by the Mexican authorities.
Consequently,  a  series  of  argreements  were
negotiated,  and  the  U.S.  undertook  measures  to
reduce  the  impact  of  saline  return  flows.  These
steps included  construction  of an extension of the
Wellton-Mohawk  drain  so  as  to  provide  Mexico
with  the  option  of bypassing  the  drainage  waters
or  accepting  them,  and  replacing  a  portion of by-
passed  waters  with  pumped  or  storage  water  in
excess  of the  treaty  commitment.  As  a  result  of
these  efforts,  the  annual  salinity  concentration
dropped  to  more  tolerable  levels,  reaching  about
1200 ppm by 1970 and  1971.
The  Mexican  Government  initiated  an  exten-
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sive  program  to  rehabilitate  the  irrigation district
facilities  in  response  to  the  reductions  in  water
quantity  and  quality.  An  estimated  $100  million
(U.S.)  has  been  spent  in  lining  canals,  improving
drainage,  and  consolidating  lands  served  by  the
system.
Further negotiations were  undertaken beginning
in  1971. In  1972  President Nixon assigned former
Attorney  General  Herbert  Brownell  the  task  of
finding a "permanent, definitive  and just" solution
to  the  problem.  As  a  result,  an  agreement  was
reached  in  August,  1973,  which was  approved  by
the  two  presidents  and  incorporated  into Minute
242  of  the  International  Boundary  Commission.
A  key  provision  requires  that  the  U.S. deliver  to
Mexico  waters  with  an  average  annual  salinity  of
not  more  than  115  ppm  (+ 30  ppm)  above  the
quality  of  diversions  at  Imperial  Dam  (the  last
U.S.  diversion  point).  To  implement  this  pro-
vision,  the  U.S.  proposed  construction  of a major
desalting  plant  for  Wellton-Mohawk  drainage
waters,  as  well  as other  temporary  steps to reduce
the  impact  of  Wellton-Mohawk  salinity.  Pending
construction  of  the  desalination  facilities,  the
water  quality  is  being  maintained  by  bypassing
Mohawk  drainage  water  and substituting upstream
stored waters to meet the treaty  quota.
Minute  242 assures  Mexico  a water  quality not
much  different  from  that  of Imperial Dam.  How-
ever,  further  agricultural,  industrial  and  energy
development  in  the  Colorado  River  Basin  may
raise salinity  on both sides of the border.
We  recently  developed  a  function which relates
economic damages  in the Mexicali Valley to various
degrees  of salinity  in irrigation  water. This damage
function  enables the  prediction  of direct economic
impacts  on  the  Mexicali  region  economy  of any
changes  in water  quality  caused  by water manage-
ment  activities  upstream  in  the  United  States.
Further,  since  benefits  of  pollution  abatement
programs  are  equavalent  to  downstream  damages
avoided,  the  damage  function  can  be employed  to
estimate  program  benefits  (Peskin  and  Seskin).
In  this  paper,  we  summarize  our procedures  and
findings,  and discuss some policy implications.
The Study  Area
The  region  studied is the area under jurisdiction
of the Water Resources Ministry,  Irrigation  District
No.  14,  known  as  the  Colorado  River  Irrigation
District.  The  District  is  located  next  to  the  U.S.
border  on  both  sides  of the  Colorado  River,  and
comprises the  Mexicali  Valley  in  the state of Baja
California  and  the  San  Luis  Valley  in the  state  of
Sonora.  For convenience,  the  entire region  will be
referred to as the Mexicali Valley.
Water  rights  are  available  for 203,000  hectares
(about  500,000 acres)  and the system serves.about
11,900  farmers.  Due  to  land  tenure  reform  pro-
grams, the holdings are  small and relatively uniform
in  size.  Private  property  landholdings  account  for
43  percent  of irrigated  lands,  while  "ejido"  hold-
ings  (federally  owned,  but  individually  farmed)
account  for  the  remainder.  In  both classes,  about
20  hectares  (49  acres)  is the  modal  size.  Water  is
available  for only  one  crop  cycle  per year  for any
given landholding.
As elsewhere  in the lower Colorado River Basin,
the  climate  is  hot  and  dry.  Average  rainfall  is  a
little  over  two  inches  per  year,  while  potential
evapotranspiration  is estimated at 92 inches.
Soils  are  basically  Colorado  River  alluvial
deposits,  similar  to  but  with  somewhat  better
drainage  than those in  the  Imperial  Valley. About
twenty-three  percent  are  heavy  soils  with  poor
internal  drainage,  while  medium  textured  soils
with adequate  drainage  acount for the  balance.
In  addition  to  surface  water supplies  from  the
Colorado  (1.5  m.a.f.),  about  1 m.a.f.  is  pumped
from  aquifers,  mainly  in the  northeastern  section
of the  region.  (Since  ground  water is also pumped
in  Arizona  from  the  common  aquifer,  a  conflict
over distribution of these waters is emerging.)
Concepts and Procedures
Economic  damages  from  degraded  water
quality  arise  from  decreased  resource  productivity
and/or  increased  production  costs  (Peskin  and
Seskin).  However,  alternative  production  technol-
ogies  may be employed which are  less expensive  to
the  farmer than suffering the damage.  Hence,  a net
income  change  measure  of damages is more appro-
priate  than simply a crop yield reduction  approach.
We  estimated  net returns  at  each water  quality
to provide  points on  a curve of net returns to water
quality.  The  regional  salinity  damage  function  is
then  derived  by  relating  predicted  net  income  at
various  levels  of Colorado  River  salinity  as  com-
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pared  to  net  income  at  the  selected  base  salinity
level.  This  process  is  equivalent  to  the  technique
for measuring water  supply  benefits known  as the
"change  in  net  income"  method,  in  which  the
maximum  willingness  to pay of affected producers
is  taken  to  be  the  net  producer's  income  with,  as
compared  without,  a  public  project  or  program
(see  U.S.  Water  Resources  Council  and  Young
and  Gray).
The  effect  of  alternative  water  quality  levels
on  net  farm  income  is  analyzed  with  a  series  of
linear  programming  models.  For  any  given  water
quality,  the model will  select the cropping pattern,
irrigation  frequencies,  and, implicitly,  the  amount
of water to apply which maximizes net return. The
procedure  is similar  to  that utilized in  the preced-
ing  paper  by  Alan  Kleinman  and  Bruce  Brown,
and  is based on the approach  developed by Charles
Moore and  others (see also Young, et al.,  1973).
Assumptions. The usual rationality and optimiz-
ing  conditions  from  production  economic  theory
are  postulated.  The  conditions  necessary  for
aggregation  of  linear  programming  models  are
assumed  to  be  met  (see  Paris  and  Rausser).  The
model  is  developed  to  represent  the  current,
post-rehabilitation  status  of the  water distribution
and  drainage  facilities, so  our results are  not neces-
sarily  representative  of the  damages which actually
occurred  at  the  onset  of high  salinity immediately
after 1960. Prices and production technology which
existed  in  1975  are  assumed.  Prices  in  Mexican
pesos  are  converted  in  this  paper  to  U.S.  dollars
at  the  current  official  exchange  rate  of 12.5 pesos
to the  dollar.  Impacts on regional economic sectors
which  are  indirectly  linked  to  irrigation  crop
production  are  not  considered.  It  is likely  that
indirect  impacts  were  large,  particularly  in  the
period  immediately  following  the  drastic  decline
in  water  quantity  and  quality.  Household  and in-
dustrial  impacts  are  also  not considered,  although,
due  to  a  relatively  low  consumption  rate,  they
are not considered  to be large.
Methods.  Considerable  detailed  data  about the
actual  production  practices  and  resource  organi-
zation  were  required  to  develop  the  models.  For
primary  data  on  resource  organization  and  pro-
duction  technology,  a survey of the Mexicali Valley
was  carried  out  during  the summer  of 1975.  Inter-
views  with  189  farmers  in  the  area were  obtained.
The  sample  was  stratified according to land tenure
and  soil  type  (see  Francisco  Oyarzabal-Tamargo
for details).
The  estimation  of yield decrements  to salinity
follows  Robinson's  approach  which  utilized  the
criteria  given  by  the  California  Committee  of
Consultants  report  for  salt  tolerance  of  crops.  A
ratio  of  soil  extract  electrical  conductivity  to
irrigation  water  conductivity  for  each  soil  type
was  obtained.  Assuming  a  steady-state  balance  in
each  soil,  irrigation  management  influence  was
taken  as  a  function  of the  soil  layer  from  which
water  was  extracted  by  the  crops.  Five  levels  of
irrigation  water  applications  were  considered.
The  soil  salinity  value  computed  for  each  level,
and  the  corresponding  yield  declination  was
obtained  from  relationships  presented  by  the
California  "Committee  of  Consultants  Guide-
lines"  and  from  Maas  and  Hoffman.  The propor-
tions  of  constituent  ions  in  dissolved  solids  in
Colorado  River  water  are  assumed  to  remain
constant  over  the  range  of  salinity  studied. Crop
yield  decrements  estimates  are  adjusted  to  reflect
the  high  gypsum  (CaSO4)  content  of  Colorado
River waters.
For the models, the Mexicali Valley  was divided
into  the  two  soil  types,  and  further stratified  by
two  property  types and  two degrees of mechaniza-
tion.  The  seven  main  crops  (cotton,  barley,
sorghum,  wheat,  alfalfa,  rye  grass,  and  safflower)
were  considered.  Models  representing  crop  pro-
duction  in  the  Mexicali  Valley  for  the  various
salinity  levels  each  consisted  of 280  real  activities
(7  crops x  5 irrigation  practices  x  2  soil  types x 2
tenure  types  x  2  technology  levels  =  280).  The
net  income  and resource  requirement  coefficients
were  calculated  for each of fourteen  salinity  levels,
from  700  ppm  to  2000  ppm  at  100  ppm  incre-
ments.  For  each  irrigation  water  salinity  level,  a
"maximum"  value  of  the  Valley  net  returns  was
obtained,  together  with  estimates  of  optimal
cropped acreages.
The  threshold  level  for  detrimental  effects  on
yields of crops  commonly  produced  in  the  area  is
700  ppm.  Net  returns  are  reduced  when  salinity
levels  are  above  700  ppm,  due  to  estimated
decreases  in crop yield and  changes in crop  acreage
as  salinity  increases.  Cost of water  per hectare,  as
well  as  the  irrigation labor  costs will increase as sa-
linity  increases-because  more  water  and  more
careful and frequent  irrigation will be needed.
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A smooth curve fitted to the points of estimated
regional  net  income  as  related  to irrigation water
salinity is shown in Figure  1.
The  difference  between the "net income"  func-
tion  and  the  base  "net  income"  results  in  the
damage  function  for  the  Mexicali  Valley.  A poly-
nominal  of  second  degree  fitted  to  the  damage
projections  by  regression  procedures  yielded  the
following  equation:
Y = -7423 + 4.08X + 0.0091X2
Where:  Y: Estimated annual  damage (103  $U.S.)
X: Irrigation water  salinity (ppm)
The  damage  function  so  obtained  appears  in
Figure 2.
Marginal  damages  can  be  computed  from  this
function.  Marginal  damages  are  smaller  at  lower
concentrations  than  at higher  concentrations.  The
marginal  damages  vary  from  U.S.  $16,000/ppm
within  the  700-  to  800-ppm  irrigation  water
salinity  range  to  U.S.  $39,000/ppm  in  the  1900-
to 2000-ppm  range.  The average marginal  damages
for  the  whole  salinity  range  considered  (700  to
2000  ppm)  is  U.S.  $28,620/ppm.  Converted  to
area  terms, the  annual  damages  are approximately
U.S.  $0.050  ppm  per  acre  (when  the  function is
evaluated at 1200 ppm).
Other  analyses  were  performed  to  assess  the
sensitivity of the  results to alternative  assumptions
concerning  irrigable  land,  water  supply  and com-
modity  prices.  While  the  aggregate  net  income
function  (Figure  1)  was  shifted  in  these  cases,
total  and  marginal  damage  estimates  were  rel-
atively unaffected.
Implication for Salinity Abatement  Policy
We present in this section some illustrative  com-
putations  of  direct  economic  damages  associated
with  specified  increments  of  irrigation  water
salinity  levels.  Implications  for water management
policy  from  the  perspectives  of both Mexico  and
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the  United  States  are  pointed  out.  While  the
damage  function  can  be  employed  to  measure
benefits  to  Mexico  of any change  in water quality,
we  limit  our  discussion  of  policy  implications  to
the  possible  impacts  of  return  flows  from  the
Wellton-Mohawk  Division  in  western  Arizona.
Saline  water  from  the  Wellton-Mohawk  drainage
system  is  the  principal  source  of  the  additional
salt  which  has  created  problems  for  Mexican
farmers  and  precipitated  the  conflicts  between
the U.S. and Mexico  over the past fifteen years.
Implications from the Mexican Viewpoint.  The
Wellton-Mohawk  drainage  system  over  the  recent
period  of years  discharged  an  average  annual  flow
of  220,00  acre-feet  with  a  total  dissolved  solids
concentration  of  about  3,700  ppm  (U.S.  Office
of  Saline  Water  and  U.S.  Bureau  of Reclamation,
1974),  If  drainage  water  of  this  quality  is mixed
with  regular  Colorado  River  flows  to  help  meet
the  1.5  million  acre-feet  compact  obligation,
1600 1800  2000
an  increment  of  some  400  ppm  in  the  quality
of water received  by Mexico is implied.
Assuming  the  water  salinity  in  the  Colorado
River before it is augmented  by the Wllton-Mohawk
drainage  water  stands  at  950  ppm,  the  direct
damages  to  the agricultural  sector  in the  Mexicali
Valley  were  computed  from  the  damage  function.
These  computations  imply  that a  400  ppm incre-
ment  in  dissolved  solids  would  impose  an  annual
cost  of  U.S.  $0.051  per ppm per  acre.  Given  this
estimate  of direct cost for a salinity increment,  the
direct  aggregated  damages  at  Mexicali  Valley  are
U.S.  $10.2 million per year.
For  another  perspective,  we  can  calculate  the
cost  per  farm.  Villareal  reports  that  the  modal
farm  in  the  Mexicali  Valley  comprises  about
twenty  hectares  or  about  49  acres  (see  also
Oyarzabal,  table  4). The  direct annual  damages to
a  typical  farm  for  the  assumed  salinity  increment
are  U.S.  $1008.  This figure  represents  over  10% of
the  average  farm  gross  income.  (It is  important to
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add  that  such  estimated  average  direct  damages
are  for  increments  in  salinity  of  400  ppm in the
range  of current  levels.  In  the  case  of  the  much
greater  salinity  increments  which  occurred  in the
early  1960's  when  the  Wellton-Mohawk  drainage
system  started  pumping  water  with  salinity  con-
centrations  of  more  than  6000  ppm, the  annual
direct  cost  per  acre  would  have  been  for a short
period  two  to  three  times  higher.  Further,  the
improved  irrigation  and  drainage  systems  which
were  installed  to cope  with  increased  salinity  and
reduced  water  supplies  were  not  yet  in  place.
Therefore  the  actual  damages  in  the  Mexicali
Valley  were  probably  even  larger  than  would  be
estimated by our damage function.)
Irrigation  water  salinity  increments,  of  such
magnitude  as  that  described  above,  represent  a
considerable  loss for the individual Mexicali Valley
farmer,  and precipitated  a  prompt and  vociferous
reaction  on his part.  These estimates  of economic
damages  make  it  clear  that  the  protests  by  the
Mexican Government  to the U.S. Government over
the  quality  decrement  were  fully  justified.  It  is
also  clear  that the sharp reduction in water quality
and  quantity experienced in the Mexicali Valley in
1961  -required  the  major  irrigation  system  reha-
bilitation  program  that  the  Mexican  government
initiated in 1968.
Mexico  can  be  seen  to  have  achieved  most of
its  objectives  in  the  1973  salinity  agreement,
but  some  concessions were  made.  The  main prob-
lem,  the  impact  of  the Wellton-Mohawk  drainage
water,  will  be  largely  solved.  However,  the Mexi-
can  authorities  accepted  a  small  increment  in
salinity  (115  ppm  above  that  at  Imperial  Dam).
More  significant,  no  compensatory  payments
for  past  damages  were  received.  However,  linking
Mexico's  water  quality  to  that  at  Imperial  Dam
will  assure  Mexico  of  sharing  in  any  future  im-
provements  in  water  quality  which  might  be
achieved  when  the  proposed  Colorado  River
Water  Quality  Improvement  Program  is  imple-
mented in the Upper Colorado  River Basin.
Economic  Considerations in Determining U.S.
Salinity Policy  Regarding Mexico.  The  U.S.  re-
sponse  regarding  Mexican  objections  to increased
salinity  has  proceded from  a) denial  that there was
a  problem,  to  b)  denial  that  there  was an  obliga-
tion  to solve  the problem,  to c)  grudging steps to-
ward its solution, to d) full acceptance  of responsi-
bility  by  the U.S.  for controlling Wellton-Mohawk
salinity.  We  believe  that  acceptance  of  responsi-
bility  for  the  salinity  of Wellton-Mohawk  project
return flows represents the only legitimate position
for  the U.S. However,  it is not at all clear that the
water management  measures  for fulfilling the terms
of  Minute  242  proposed  by  the  Brownell  Com-
mission  represent  the  most  economical  solution
to the problem.
U.S.  policy makers must make decisions on two
aspects  of salinity  control  regarding  Mexico.  The
first  decision  involves  choice  of  which  level  (or
levels)  of  the  government  (federal,  regional,
state,  local district)  and if the private sector water
users  should  assume  responsibility  for implement-
ing  and  financing  the control program.  Economic
efficiency  considerations  would  suggest  that the
economic  units  which  are  the  source  of  the
problem,  the  Wellton-Mohawk  Division  water
users,  should  be  confronted  with  the  external
costs which  they are imposing  on the downstream
user.  Faced  with  the  total  social  cost  of their ir-
rigation  practices,  Wellton-Mohawk  Division water
users,  should  be  confronted  with the external cost
of  their  irrigation  practices,  Wellton-Mohawk
Division  farmers  would  be expected to alter their
allocation  of  resources  in  such  a  way  as to move
toward  a  level  and  mix  of  production  activities
which  maximizes  productivity  of  the  water  re-
source.  Equity  considerations  also  suggest  that
those responsible  for the problem bear the costs of
mitigation,  rather  than passing  the  cost off to the
federal  taxpayer,  although  in  this  instance,  the
point  is  less  clear.  (The  contrary  argument  runs
somewhat as follows. Since the federal government,
through  the  Bureau  of  Reclamation  created  the
Wellton-Mohawk  Division, it should  assume  finan-
cial  responsibility  for  any  unanticipated  side
effects  of its earlier  water  development  programs.
The  point  has  merit,  but  its  acceptance  would
perpetuate  the  situation  in  which  the local  bene-
ficiary  groups  who,  in  fact,  initiate  reclamation
projects remain  in a  "no-lose"  situation.  Irrigation
projects  are  typically  financed  in such  a way as to
assure  that  water  users  receive  a  generous  federal
subsidy.  It  would  seem  appropriate  that,  along
with  the  gains,  project beneficiaries  accept at least
some  proportion  of  the  risk  of  unanticipated
spillover effects.)
The  second  decision  facing  the  U.S.  involves
the  choice  of  technique  for  mitigation  or  solu-
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tion.  Possible  mitigation  techniques  range  from,
on  the  one  hand,  structural  approaches  (which
involve engineering works of some sort) to changes
in rules and incentive  systems. While the politics of
water resource  management  has invariably favored
approaches  emphasizing  construction  of facilities
by  federal  agencies  and financing  from  the public
treasury, non-structural  approaches may often pro-
vide  much  more  economical  solutions  to  water
management problems (see Gilbert White).
The  Brownell  Commission  proposal  centers
around  construction  and  operation  of  a  desalina-
tion  plant  on  the  Wellton-Mohawk  drain  near
Yuma,  Arizona.  It  also  includes  a  program  to
achieve  improved  irrigation  efficiences  in the Divi-
sion,  a  reduction  in  the  Division's  size  and other,
mostly  temporary actions.  Costs of the plan would
be  largely  obtained  from  federal  appropriations.
This  proposal  was selected  by  the  United  States
from  among other  alternatives  considered such as:
1) total shutdown of the Wellton-Mohawk Division;
b)  augmentation  of the Colorado  River by  an  ex-
change  agreement  for  substitution  of water  from
the  California  State  Water  Project  or  by  weather
modification;  c)  a  moratorium  on future  develop-
ment  in  the  Colorado  River  Basin;  d)  no  action
(see Brownell and Eaton).
The  proposed  solution  can be  seen to embody
federal  responsibility  and  financing  and  an
engineering-structural  approach.
William  Martin  has criticized  the proposal, not-
ing that  it represents  a structural/engineering  solu-
tion  which  avoids  confronting  the  institutional
causes  of  the  problem.  Disincentives  to  polluters
are not even included in the alternatives considered.
With regard to the  issue  of establishing respon-
sibility  for  the  salt  discharge,  the opportunity  to
assign  the  costs  where  they  belong,  to Arizona,
was apparently  missed.  A President  whose author-
ity  was  crumbling  from  the  Watergate  affair,  and
who  himself  was  a  southern  Californian,  did  not
insist  that  the  federal  taxpayer  not  be the  source
of  the  solution.  Arizona  thus  can  "have  its  cake
and eat it too." That is,  degraded return flows will
not  be  charged  against  Arizona's  Colorado  River
entitlement,  an  that  State  will  not be  faced  with
hard  choices  about  whether  to use  water  in  the
Wellton-Mohawk,  elsewhere  in  Yuma  County,  or
in Central Arizona.
Two  examples  will  suffice  to show  that a  non-
structural  approach  can  be much more economical
than  the  desalination  plant  alternative.  Our  first
case is  the economist's  favorite  policy instrument,
an effleunt tax (Kneese and Schultze).
A  direct  charge  on  saline  return  flow  is  prob-
ably technically  infeasible,  due to the difficulty  of
assigning  drainage  water  to  specific  producers.
However,  a  tax  levied  indirectly  on  water  deliv-
eries  is more  practical,  since  water  supplied  to in-
dividual  producers  can  be  readily  measured.  An
equitable  method might  be to impose a charge for
water  delivered  in excess  of reasonable  evapotran-
spiration and leaching requirements.
An  efficient  effluent  charge  should  reflect the
damages  imposed  on  downstream  water  users.
Without  a  complex hydro-salinity  model, the  pre-
cise  effects  of  a  reduction  in  drainage  water  on
total  salt  discharge  cannot  be  determined.  How-
ever,  some  rough  calculations  could  be  suggested.
Our  computations  show  that  damages  in  the
Mexicali  area  amount  to about  $46  per acre-foot
of  drainage  water  released  from  the  Wellton-
Mohawk  Division.  The  findings  of Kelso,  Martin
and  Mack  indicate  a  water  charge  of  this magni-
tude on excess water diversions  would be expected
to have  a  significant  impact on water management
and salinity in return flows.
We have also analyzed the economic  desirability
of direct compensation  to Mexico as an alternative
to the proposed  desalination plant. The U.S. Office
of  Saline  Water  and  the  Bureau of Reclamation's
Environmental Impact  Station indicates  an annual
cost of $16.5 million (even at 1973  prices) for cap-
ital  and  operating  expenses  for  the  desalination
complex.  We  reported  above  an  estimate  of 10.2
million  in  annual  damages in Mexico. Direct  repar-
ations  for  damages  is  therefore  a  less  expensive
approach, by over six million dollars per year.
If the  federal  government  is  to be responsible,
a  more  desirable  alternative would be to avoid any
irreversible  commitments to a desalination complex
and  keep  policy  options  open.  We  feel  that  the
interim  solution  which  is  in effect  while  the pro-
gram  planning  takes  place,  probably  is  the  most
efficient  course  for  some  time,  perhaps  for  two
or more  decades.  Drainage  water is being bypassed
without  charge  to the  Mexican  quota, and the  full
1.5  million  acre-feet  is  being  supplied  from  up-
stream  releases.  In  spite  of considerable  rhetoric
to  the  contrary,  water  is  not scarce  at present in
the  Colorado  River Basin.  Arizona and the Upper
Basin  states  do not at  present use their allotment,
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and  will  not do  so  for some  years.  The  California
Water  Project  provides  southern California  with  a
supply  of good  quality water which will suffice for
the  remainder  of  the  century. Hence  the  realistic
alternative  use for much of the water supply is add-
ing  to  storage  in  the  Basin.  Two hundred  twenty
thousand  acre-feet  per  year  to  replace  Wellton-
Mohawk  drainage  will  not  involve  any  significant
sacrifice  of alternative  uses  for  the next decade  or
two.  Even  then,  only  completion  of  the  Central
Arizona  Project  combined  with  massive  energy
development  (oil  shale,  coal  gasification)  would
create demands  in excess of expected supplies.
Conclusion
The  problem  of  salinity  in  Colorado  River
waters  entering Mexico  has  been perhaps the  most
troublesome  issue  in  Mexican-American  relations
in  recent  years.  The  technical  complexity  of  the
problem  and  the  strong  political  forces  on either
side of the border have made it difficult to achieve
a mutually  satisfactory  resolution.
The  salinity  damage  function  estimated  for the
Mexicali  Valley  implies  that inclusion in the Mexi-
can  water quota of untreated saline irrigation return
flows  from  the  Wellton-Mohawk  project  would
cause  net  income  reduction  of  over  ten  million
dollars  per year.  This  finding confirms  the validity
of the Mexican protests on the issue.
The acceptance of responsibility  by the U.S.  for
the  quality degradation  is laudable, and plans to im-
plement  the  intent  of the  1973  agreement  should
be  carried  out.  The  structural solution-a  desalina-
tion  plant-is  excessively  expensive,  and  a  long-
term  solution  which involves  shifting of incentives
so  as  to discourage  excess salt  discharges should be
sought on both efficiency  and equity grounds.
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